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10 Law, politics, and international
governance
Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet
The politics of international law are inextricably linked to the issue
of governance. In this chapter we approach the central themes of the
book by considering this vexed issue, developing four key arguments.
First, we define and conceptualise institutions and governance so that
any alleged distinction between law and politics becomes untenable or
irrelevant. Our claim here directly addresses two of the three questions
put forward by Christian Reus-Smit (in chapters 1 and 2) as animat-
ing this book: How should we think of international law and interna-
tional politics? What is the relationship between the two? Our empirical
discussion responds to the third question: How does rethinking these
categories enable us better to understand contemporary international
relations? We agree with Reus-Smit that international law and politics
infuse and shape each other, although we understand this relationship
somewhat differently. Second, we are concerned with the sources and
uses of power in international society. Elaborating on the distinction
drawn by Reus-Smit between realist and constructivist approaches, we
distinguish normative-ideational power (influence through argumenta-
tion and suasion, dear to constructivists) from material-physical power
(influence through the manipulation of threats and coercion, empha-
sised by realists). Third, we develop a relatively abstract model of how
institutions emerge and evolve in two kinds of social settings: the dyadic
and the triadic. Finally, we illustrate our theoretical ideas with reference
to the development of triadic forms of governance in the context of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and dyadic in the case
of forcible humanitarian intervention.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. In part one, we define our terms
and concepts. In part two, we specify the conditions under which third-
party dispute resolution will organise institutional change over time,
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using the transformation of the international trade regime as a case in
point. In part three, we discuss how institutional change takes place in
the absence of a third party, and explore the question of humanitarian
intervention. In the conclusion, we consider the implications of our ar-
guments for various theoretical projects in international relations and
international law.
Rules, dispute resolution, and institutional change
We seek to explain some of the dynamics of institutional change, by
which we mean the emergence of new, or the transformation of existing,
rule systems. The basic components of our model operate on three levels
of analysis:
 macro level: the rule system, or institutional environment, that enables
and sustains social activity;
 micro level: the domain of action and decision making by individual
actors;
 meso level: those structures – concrete and organisational, or abstract
and discursive – that people create and use in order to coordinate rule
systems and purposive action.
Institutions
Rule systems, or institutions, enable actors to conceive, pursue, and
express their interests and desires, but also to co-ordinate those desires
with other individuals. We take a broad view on social structure, heavily
informed by what has by now become virtually generic social theory.1
Our conception of macro structure is congruent with what Douglass
North calls ‘institutions’, variously: ‘rules of the game’, ‘customs and
traditions’, ‘conventions, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, statute
law, common law, and contracts’.2 It encompasses James March and
Johan Olsen’s notion of ‘rules’: the ‘beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures,
and knowledge’ that permit us to ‘identif[y] the normatively appropriate
1 See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Walter W. Powell and Paul J.
Dimaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1992).
2 North, Institutions, pp. 3–6.
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behavior’.3 It is capable of equating norms, as Michael Taylor does, with
‘ideologies’ and ‘culture’,4 and with Harry Eckstein’s view of ‘culture’
as a system of ‘mediating orientations . . . general dispositions of actors
to act in certain ways in sets of situations’.5 And it can understand
‘institutionalized rules’, in Ronald Jepperson’s terms, as ‘performance
scripts’.6
We see institutions as rule structures. Rules, of course, vary; they
can be more, or less, formal, precise, and authoritative; and they may
be more or less tied to organisational supports, including enforcement
mechanisms.7 We could array institutions along a continuum. At the
left end of the continuum are institutional settings that are relatively
informal, with imprecise rules that are not binding on actors, and where
there are no centralised monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. (This
is not to say that these settings lack rules; social existence of any kind
is impossible without norms, even if the norms in place are relatively
informal and imprecise.) At the right end of the continuum are insti-
tutional contexts defined by rules that are highly formal, specific, and
authoritative; these have the attributes that people associate with highly
developed legal orders. Other institutions would fall between these two
extremes.
At the international level, all established institutional structures
would occupy different points on the spectrum.8 Some international
institutions are highly formal, specific, and authoritative. The European
3 James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Pol-
itics (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 22.
4 Michael Taylor, ‘Structure, Culture and Action in the Explanation of Social Change’,
Politics and Society 17: 2 (1989), 135.
5 Harry Eckstein, ‘A Culturalist Theory of Political Change’, American Political Science
Review 82: 3 (1988), 790.
6 Ronald L. Jepperson, ‘Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism’, in Powell
and Dimaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, p. 145.
7 See Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein, ‘The Institutionalization
of European Space’, in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein (eds.), The
Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
8 Alec Stone, in ‘What is a Supranational Constitution?: An Essay in International Re-
lations Theory’, Review of Politics 56: 3 (1994), elaborated a continuum in which the rule
structures constituting various international regime forms could be situated. The contin-
uum captures three dimensions: degree of normative precision, degree of formality, and
degree of organisational capacity to monitor compliance and punish non-compliance. In
a recent special issue of International Organization, a research project on the ‘legalisation’
of international politics adopts, as an analytical/heuristic device or dependent variable,
a continuum that largely reproduces these same elements. See Judith Goldstein, Miles
Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds.), Special Issue on the Legaliza-
tion of International Politics, International Organization 54: 3 (2000).
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Union (EU) now resembles, in important respects, a ‘constitutionalised’,
quasi-federal polity.9 During the same period, the GATT10 developed
an important degree of formality, precision, and authoritativeness, if
less than the EU, which its mutation into the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO) took much further.11 Much of organised international
relations fall further to the left on the continuum. The distinctive in-
stitution of modern international law that Reus-Smit describes in chap-
ters 1 and 2 would thus be most developed near the right end of our
spectrum.
As one moves along the continuum from left to right, the nature of
political activity changes. The left end of the spectrum resembles what
international relations scholars have traditionally referred to as ‘anar-
chy’, meaning not absence of order but the lack of formal structures of
government and authoritative dispute resolution. At the left end, bar-
gaining, negotiation, and coercion are standard modes of interaction.
Toward the right side of the spectrum, politics are more structured by
legal rules and judicialised dispute resolution. There are ‘islands’ of
such institutionalised rules and governance structures in international
relations, including the European Union, the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism, and the world of transnational business.12 As Reus-Smit
argues in chapter 1, politics tends to be a qualitatively different activity
within the framework of law than outside of it.
In the opening chapter to this volume, Reus-Smit makes a strong case
for taking seriously the constitutive power of institutions, arguing that
they can shape actors’ identities, roles, and, therefore, their interests.
Although we accept the logic of this argument, our chapter focuses on
the relationship between institutions – law and norms – and observable
behaviour, including the development of norm-based argumentation,
legal discourse, and ‘judicialised’ politics. It is exceptionally difficult
to assess relationships among institutions, identities, and interests as
9 Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, American
Journal of International Law 75: 1 (1981); and Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of
Europe’, Yale Law Journal 100: 7 (1991).
10 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT
Legal System (Salem, NH: Butterworth, 1993).
11 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organi-
zation and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948’, Common
Market Law Review 31: 6 (1994).
12 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Islands of Transnational Governance’, in Martin Shapiro and
Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
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they evolve in dynamic systems. Although we are comfortable with the
notion that rule systems – and the flow of politics within institutions –
may alter the identities and preferences of actors, we content ourselves
with providing the kind of evidence that those who would make such
claims might use. But we do not directly address what we take to be the
basic epistemological question: pursuant to some observable alteration
of the institutional environment, is a given, stable shift in the observable
behaviour of any actor or set of actors best explained by (1) a change in
the actors’ preferences or identities, or (2) a change in actors’ strategies
(with preferences fixed)?
Of course, institutions persist because they are in some sense func-
tional constructions, whether in an old-fashioned anthropological or
new-fashioned economistic sense. Among other things, they provide
people with behavioural guidance, reduce uncertainty and transaction
costs, and thereby facilitate social exchange and co-operation. Con-
ceived more sociologically, any social setting, or organisational field, is
nothing but a specific set of normative solutions to a specific set of social
problems. Even accepting these points, two problems necessarily arise.
First, institutions are abstractions. At best they constitute templates or
choice-contexts for action. Put differently, because rule structures do not
apply themselves, they are always at least relatively indeterminate. The
precise nature, scope, and content of relevant duties and obligations can
only be known (if at all) through processes of interpretation and appli-
cation. Second, institutions, partly because they are abstract, can, in and
of themselves, be a source of disputes that erupt between individuals.
That is, a dispute may reveal tensions and inconsistencies within rule
structures, at least with respect to that dispute. Thus, to the extent that
any normative construct is in fact relevant to a particular situation, de-
cision, or action, it can never be innocent of politics and the exercise of
power.
In short, rule structures are at the heart of any dispute that might in-
terest social scientists, for two reasons. First, the inevitable gap between
general rules and specific actions means that the application of rules
is always subject to interpretation and contestation. Second, because
no complex rule system provides comprehensive solutions to conflicts
among all of its constituent components, tensions and contradictions
among norms are also commonplace, and likewise fuel debate. When
normative disputes of these kinds arise, actors bring to bear both nor-
mative and material powers, and thus the distinction between law and
politics vanishes.
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Actors and action
Whenever individuals interact with each other, they inevitably build
norm-based structures, rules of language and action considered appro-
priate to a given set of interactions. We assume that in these interactions,
people are rational, in the sense of being utility maximisers. Within con-
straints imposed by institutions, resource limitations, and imperfect in-
formation, actors will seek to develop optimal strategies with which to
pursue their interests. The game theoretic point that rules systems struc-
ture strategic calculation (a change in the rules of the game will always
lead to different play, and thus different outcomes), simply privileges
institutions as crucial factors generating political outcomes. Further, in-
stitutions possess the capacity to help mitigate imbalances of material or
physical power between actors. Indeed, normative systems typically an-
nounce rules that either (1) do not take into account such asymmetries, or
(2) invoke principles (such as equity or fairness) that give advantages to
the weaker party. We do not deny that seemingly ‘power-neutral’ norms
often reflect underlying distributions of power. Our point is rather the
contrary: norms are always implicated in politics. Last, in situations
where information is imperfect in some meaningful way, institutions
will be all the more important13 to how actors make sense of their world
and select courses of action.
If we see actors as bearers of interests, that is not all we see. Ratio-
nality, in the utility-maximising sense, is not the only logic of action
(or micro-foundation) relevant to institutional change. As a diverse set
of social scientists have noticed and begun to theorise,14 norms tend
to develop in processes that are both incremental and path dependent.
The deep structures of this process are cognitive and pre-social: human
beings have native or ‘instinctual’ capacities for language. Indeed, we
would argue that the ability to think about rules in complex ways –
reasoning from precedent and weighing contradictory norms – is as in-
nately human as the ‘language instinct’.15 Robert Sugden points out that
‘ordinary people with limited rationality’ find little difficulty in solving
co-ordination problems that the fully rational players in game theory
13 See North, Institutions.
14 For example March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, chapter 2; Alec Stone Sweet,
‘Judicialization and the Construction of Governance’, Comparative Political Studies 32: 2
(1999); and Robert Sugden, ‘Spontaneous Order’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3: 4
(1989).
15 The phrase borrows the title of a superb book by Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct
(New York: W. Morrow, 1994).
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find intractable, and suggests that the ability to work with conventions
and norms is innate, even biological.16 We observe people reasoning
and talking about rules in every kind of social group. That observation
lends some prima facie credibility to the notion that normative reasoning,
based on analogies that link rules to situations, is at least as innate and
fundamental to humans as utilitarian calculation.
For cognitive psychologists, analogical reasoning is the process
through which people ‘reason and learn about a new situation (the target
analog) by relating it to a more familiar situation (the source analog) that
can be viewed as structurally parallel’.17 The ability to construct analo-
gies is widely considered to be an innate part of thinking.18 Unfamiliar
situations, those that individuals cannot understand through their gen-
eralised knowledge, stimulate the formation of analogies, which are
used to conceptualise and to find solutions to problems.19 The set of po-
tential source analogs is defined jointly by (1) the specific, immediate
problem to be resolved (or situation to be conceptualised), and (2) the
past experiences of the individuals constructing the analogy. Fore-
shadowing somewhat, we view normative deliberation, including legal
argumentation and judging, as a species of analogical reasoning: actors
reason from existing institutions (the equivalents of source analogs), to
characterise the interplay of new fact contexts and interests raised by a
dispute (the target analog), and to find an appropriate solution to it.20
As Reus-Smit argues in chapter 2, actors simultaneously engage in pur-
posive and instrumental logics (maximising) and in logics of obligation
and justification (or normative reasoning).
16 Sugden, ‘Spontaneous Order’, 89, 95.
17 Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard, ‘The Analogical Mind’, American Psychologist 52: 1
(1997), 35.
18 Mark Keane, Analogical Problem Solving (Chichester, UK: Ellis Horwood Ltd, 1988); Stella
Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony (eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard, Mental Leaps: Anal-
ogy in Creative Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and Richard Mayer, Thinking
and Problem Solving: An Introduction to Human Cognition and Learning, 2nd edn (New York:
W. H. Freeman & Co, 1992).
19 Keane, Analogical Problem Solving, p. 103.
20 See James Murray, ‘The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning’, UCLA Law Review 29:
4 (1982); Cass Sunstein, ‘On Analogical Reasoning’, Harvard Law Review 106: 3 (1993);
Garry Marchant, John Robinson, Urton Anderson, and Michael Schadewald, ‘Analogi-
cal Transfer and Expertise in Legal Reasoning’, Organizational Behavior and Human De-
cision Processes 48: 2 (1991); and Garry Marchant, John Robinson, Urton Anderson,
and Michael Schadewald, ‘The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument: Problem Similar-
ity, Precedent, and Expertise’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 55: 1
(1993).
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Dispute resolution and governance
Typical sources of conflicts can be listed but need not detain us much.
An actor may succumb to temptations to renege on promises made in
order to obtain advantage (the prisoner’s dilemma). As circumstances
change, actors may come to different views on the legitimacy of the
existing rules that govern a relationship, and seek to replace those with
new ones. Or, as norms evolve, and social interactions become more
complex, actors may disagree about if and how a specific set of rules is
to be applied to the situation in which they find themselves. Last, some
rule systems offer actors more than one normatively defensible means
of resolving a conflict, even when the disputants agree about the nature
or type of dispute they are in.
Institutions facilitate dispute resolution. They do so in three ways.
First, at the level of the single actor, a norm can prevent disputes from
arising in the first place, by providing individuals with behavioural
guidance, and by structuring choices concerning compliance. Second,
once a dispute has erupted, norms may provide the contracting parties
with the materials for settling the dispute on their own, dyadically as
it were, to the extent that norms furnish the bases for evaluating both
the disputed behaviour and potential solutions to the conflict. Third,
existing rule systems help third-party dispute resolvers do their jobs, by
providing templates for determining the nature of the dispute and an
appropriate solution.
We define governance as the process through which rule systems are
adapted to the needs and purposes of those who live under them.21
Modes of governance are social mechanisms for constructing rules and
for applying them to concrete situations. Given changing circumstances,
all social systems require such mechanisms if they are to reproduce
themselves. We focus here on how two types of governance serve both
to resolve disputes and to evolve institutions. Both are meso-level struc-
tures that, under certain conditions, will forge linkages between macro
abstractions and micro particularities. To the extent that they operate
with effectiveness, they will help to bind together, and mediate between,
the domain of rules and the domain of action, giving institutions at least
a measure of determinancy that they would otherwise lack.
The first structure, the argumentation framework, is cognitive and
discursive. Argumentation frameworks (what Anglo-Saxon lawyers
21 Stone Sweet, ‘Judicialization and the Construction of Governance’.
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often call doctrine) organise how disputants make normative claims
and engage one another’s respective arguments. Following Giovani
Sartori,22 these structures can be analysed as a series of inference steps,
represented by a statement justified by reasons (or inference rules), that
lead to a conclusion. Legal frameworks typically embody inconsistency,
to the extent that they offer, for each inference step, both a defensible
argument and counter-argument, from which contradictory – but
defensible – conclusions can be reached.
Although we have argued that rule systems, including law, are in-
determinate, argumentation frameworks provide a measure of (at least
short-term) systemic stability, to the extent that they condition how ac-
tors pursue their self-interest, social justice, or other values through
normative deliberation. To be effective in this discursive politics, actors
have to be able to identify the type of dispute in which they are involved,
reason through the range of legal norms that are potentially applicable,
and assess available remedies and their consequences. Argumentation
frameworks, being a formalised analog, help actors do all of these things,
and more. They require actors not only to engage in analogic reasoning,
but in argumentation. Considered in more sociological terms, they are
highly formal, meso-level structures that connect institutions (such as
the law) to the domain of individual agency, by sustaining deliberation
about the nature, scope, and application of norms. In culturalist terms,
they enable specifically placed social actors to adjust abstract ‘guides to
action’ to ‘the relentless particularity of experience’,23 on a continuous
basis.
The second structure is the triad, where two parties to a dispute del-
egate their conflict to a third party for resolution. All forms of dispute
resolution can be classified as either dyadic or triadic. The distinction
is straightforward. In dyadic contexts, the parties to a dispute seek to
define a solution between themselves, that is, without recourse to an
external mediator, arbitrator, or judge. In that sense, we might think of
dyadic settings as formally anarchic (which is not to say without or-
der), because there exists no authoritative dispute resolver outside the
dyad. Dyadic dispute resolution can thus take multiple forms: imposi-
tion (a stronger party coerces a weaker one), negotiation, persuasion.
Such forms of dispute resolution are ubiquitous; we see them between
spouses, labour and management, many interstate conflicts, and so on.
22 Giovanni Sartor, ‘A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation’, Ratio Juris 7: 2 (1994).
23 Eckstein, ‘A Culturalist Theory of Political Change’, 795–6.
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Moreover, describing a dispute resolution process as dyadic does not
mean that only two actors are involved. Multilateral disputes (that is,
involving more than two parties), can be seen as a collection of linked
bilateral relationships. The label ‘dyadic’ simply refers to the absence of
an outside adjudicator.
Triadic dispute resolution, naturally, embraces all settings in which,
in addition to the parties themselves, there is a ‘third party’ (which can
also be a collectivity of multiple actors, including enforcers), who assists
in finding, or authoritatively determining, resolution of the dispute. To
move from dyadic to triadic systems of dispute resolution is to move
from anarchy to hierarchy. Empirically, forms of triadic dispute resolu-
tion vary along a continuum that roughly stretches from mediation to
arbitration to adjudication. As we move left to right on this continuum,
the authority of the triadic entity, vis-à-vis the parties, is enhanced and
institutionalised in ever more formal rules and procedures.
We view judging as a species of analogic reasoning which produces
marginal adjustments to the law over time. Further, to the extent that
judgements are motivated with reasons, and to the extent that some
minimally robust conception of precedent operates, dispute resolution
will serve not only to construct the law but to delineate argumentation
frameworks. Where adjudication is both intensive and effective, prior
records of decision-making, curated by legal actors as precedents, will
cluster and congeal in argumentation frameworks. These frameworks
will organise normative deliberation and analogical reasoning, and help
to reinforce the authority of the triadic entity.
Under certain conditions, dispute resolution will provoke normative
innovation. Where these conditions are met, the sequence – rule struc-
tures > social exchange > disputing > dispute resolution (through nor-
mative deliberation or delegation to a third party) > rule-making >
institutional change > social exchange – will tend to reproduce itself in
a self-reinforcing process. We will try to defend these claims in the next
two sections.
Triadic dispute resolution and governance
The causal relationship between triadic dispute resolution (TDR) and
rule innovation is well-known, and has been theorised in quite di-
verse theoretical languages.24 If the triadic entity resolves disputes in a
24 For example, H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press,
1994), chapter 7; Karl Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The
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minimally respectable (rather than arbitrary or a fraudulent) manner,
and gives reasons for her decisions, then these decisions will contain
materials for consolidating existing, or building new, norms. Given two
conditions, TDR is likely to generate powerful pedagogical – or positive
feedback – effects, to be registered on subsequent social exchange and
dispute resolution. First, actors must perceive that they are better off in
a world with TDR than without it. If they do, and if they are rational,
they will evaluate the rulefulness of any potential action and anticipate
the probable outcome issuing from TDR. Second, the dispute resolver
must understand that her decisions have some authoritative – that is,
precedential – value.
If these conditions are met, then the more people go to a triadic entity,
the more that entity will exercise authority over the relevant rule sys-
tem. A virtuous circle is thereby constructed: to the extent that TDR is
effective, it will reduce the costs of social exchange; as social exchange
increases in scope, so will the demand for the authoritative interpre-
tation of rules; as TDR is exercised, the body of rules that constitutes
normative structure steadily will expand, becoming more elaborate and
differentiated; these rules then will feed back onto dyadic relationships,
structuring future interactions, conflict, and dispute resolution.
If exercised on an ongoing and effective basis, TDR is likely to con-
stitute a crucial mechanism of social cohesion and change, by prop-
agating and sustaining the development of expansive argumentation
frameworks. To put it in constructivist terms, triadic governance will
help to co-ordinate the complex relationship between structures and
agents,25 helping to constitute and reconstitute both over time. In ratio-
nalist terms, the move from the dyad to the triad replaces games, like
the prisoner’s dilemma or chicken, with an entirely different strategic
context. Although game theorists have begun to notice the challenge,26
they have had difficulty modelling ‘triadic’.27
Problem of Juristic Method’, Yale Law Journal 49: 8 (1940), 1373; Alf Ross, On Law and
Justice (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958); Martin Shapiro, ‘Stability and Change in Judi-
cial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or Stare Decisis?’, Law in Transition Quarterly 2: 3
(1965); and Stone Sweet, ‘Judicialization and the Construction of Governance’.
25 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
26 For example, Randall L. Calvert, ‘Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions’,
in Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.), Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor, MI: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1995).
27 See the exchange between Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Rules, Dispute Resolution, and Strategic
Behavior’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 10: 3 (1998) and Georg Vanberg, ‘Reply to Stone
Sweet’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 10: 3 (1998).
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We now examine the impact of TDR on the international trade regime,
an arena in which judicial power had been initially, and by design, ex-
cluded. By judicial power, we mean the capacity of a triadic dispute
resolver to authoritatively determine the content of a community’s nor-
mative structure. In the GATT, an international treaty established rules
governing relations between states; yet the regular use of TDR led to the
mutation of these relations, and a new regime was thereby constituted.
We use the term ‘judicialisation’ as shorthand for this mutation.
The judicialisation of the international trade regime
When the GATT (1948) entered into force and was institutionalised as
an organisation, ‘anti-legalism’ reigned.28 Diplomats excluded lawyers
from GATT organs and opposed litigating violations of the treaty. In the
1950s, TDR emerged in the form of the panel system. Panels, composed
of three to five members, usually GATT diplomats, acquired authority
through the consent of two disputing states. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
system underwent a process of judicialisation. States began aggressively
litigating disputes; panels began treating the treaty as enforceable law,
and their own interpretations of that law as constituting authoritative
precedents; jurists and trade specialists replaced diplomats on panels.
The process generated the conditions necessary for the emergence of the
compulsory system of adjudication now in place in the WTO.
Normative structure and dispute resolution
The GATT is the most comprehensive commercial treaty in history, today
governing more than five-sixths of world trade. In the 1955–74 period,
membership jumped from 34 to 100 states; 124 states signed the Final
Act of the Uruguay Round (establishing the WTO) in 1993. The treaty’s
core provision is a generalised equal treatment rule, the most favoured
nation (MFN) principle, which rests on reciprocity: each party to the
GATT must provide to every other party all the advantages provided
to other trading partners. The treaty further prohibits, with some ex-
ceptions, import quotas. The organisation also supports an interstate
forum for legislating trade law: eight ‘rounds’ have reduced most tariffs
to the point of insignificance and, less successfully, restricted non-tariff
barriers to trade.
The treaty exhorts members to settle their disputes dyadically, in ac-
cordance with GATT rules. The potential for a trade conflict to move
28 Olivier Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 70–1; and Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, p. 137.
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to a triadic stage was implied: if state A could demonstrate that it had
suffered damages due to violations of GATT law committed by state B,
state A could be authorised by the GATT membership as a whole to
withdraw advantages or concessions that it would normally be required
to accord state B. Almost immediately, however, member states invented
the panel system to resolve disputes.
As institutionalised in the 1950s, the system blended mediation and
consensual adjudication, against a backdrop of ongoing dyadic dispute
resolution. Defendants could not be compelled to participate in TDR. By
denying consent, a state could block the construction of a panel, reject
proposed panelists, and refuse to allow a ruling to be reported. Rela-
tive to compulsory forms of adjudication, the system appeared grossly
inefficient. The original function of panels, however, was to facilitate
dyadic conflict resolution, not to punish violators or to make trade law.
Diplomats, trade generalists who saw expedience in flexible rules and
detriment in rigid ones, sat on panels. When mediation failed, panels
could, with the consent of the disputants, resolve conflicts according to
relevant treaty provisions.
Before 1970, states did not exploit the connection between TDR and
rule-making. But, being both imprecise and rigid, the regime’s norma-
tive structure proved insufficient to sustain optimal levels of trade over
time. The treaty mixes a few hard obligations (the MFN norm and tariff
schedules) with a great many statements of principle and aspiration.
Despite its flexibility, important GATT provisions could be revised only
by unanimous consent. Although the success of the GATT was partly
due to normative imprecision – the more vague a rule, the easier it was
for states to sign on to it – textual imprecision was often locked in by
the unanimity requirement. The tension is obvious. Achieving optimal
levels of exchange partly depends on the continuous adaptation of ab-
stract rules to concrete situations, but the GATT legislator was ill-suited
to perform this adaptation for the trade regime.
Building the triad
Beginning in 1970, the largest trading states turned to the panel sys-
tem not just to resolve their trade conflicts, but to make trade policy.
After falling into desuetude in the 1960s (only seven complaints filed),
TDR exploded into prominence afterwards. Of the 207 complaints filed
through 1989, 72 per cent were filed after 1969, and 56 per cent after
1979. The four largest trading states – Canada, the EC, Japan, and the
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US – dominated panel proceedings: in the 1980s, over 80 per cent of all
disputes registered involved two of these four states.
The expansion of global exchange, and the domestic political con-
sequences of that expansion, broadly explain the renaissance of TDR.
Bilateral exchange among the big four (Canada, the EC, Japan, and the
US) rose from $15 billion in 1959, to $44 billion in 1969, to $234 billion
in 1979, to $592 billion in 1989. As trade redistributed resources and
employment across productive sectors within national economies, do-
mestic actors mobilised to protect their interests. And as these economies
came to produce virtually the same products for export (for example,
electronics, automobiles, food products), trade relations were easily in-
terpreted in zero-sum terms.
By 1970, new forms of protectionism had proliferated, the Gold Stan-
dard currency regime was rapidly disintegrating, and the American
trade deficit had become chronic. The need for clearer rules and bet-
ter compliance was acute. At the same time, the GATT legislator had
failed to liberalise certain crucial sectors (for example, agriculture), to
dismantle the mosaic of non-tariff barriers that had emerged in re-
sponse to tariff reduction (for example, restrictive licensing policies and
production standards), and to regulate other practices that distorted
trade (for example, subsidies). Led by the US, which was also groping
for ways to reduce its trade deficit, governments turned to the panel
system.29
Three general motivations animated the move to TDR. In the vast ma-
jority of instances, states initiated complaints in order to induce other
states to modify their domestic trading rules. As we will see, GATT pan-
els proved to be a relatively effective means of doing so. Second, states
appealed to panels in order to alter, clarify, or make more effective ex-
isting GATT rules. This motivation overlaps the first, since virtually all
trade disputes are translatable into a general argument about the mean-
ing and application of specific treaty provisions. Disputants worked to
convince panels to adopt their versions of GATT rules, in order to en-
courage the spread of practices they considered lawful and to discour-
age practices they considered unlawful. Third, while difficult to verify,
29 Disputants tend to litigate what diplomats failed to legislate. Conflicts over agriculture
and subsidies paralysed trade negotiations, and they also dominated TDR processes after
1970. Of 115 complaints filed in the 1980s, 51 (44 per cent) concerned trade in agricultural
goods. Of the 44 disputes filed citing one of the GATT codes, 21 (or 48 per cent) relied on
rules found in the subsidies code.
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governments sometimes participated in TDR to delegitimise – and thus
facilitate the revision of – their own trade practices.30
To maximise their success, governments had a powerful interest in
replacing diplomats and generalists with lawyers and trade specialists.
The Americans understood this immediately; the Nixon Administra-
tion turned GATT litigation over to trade lawyers in 1970. By that year,
the enormous complexity of trade disputes – the resolution of which
requires determining (a) the extent to which a specific domestic law or
administrative practice conforms with treaty provisions, and (b) the ex-
tent to which, in cases of non-conformity, such a law or practice had
caused, or might cause, trade distortions – was far beyond the capac-
ity of anyone but the lawyer and the expert. Once introduced by the
Americans, lawyerly discourse perpetuated itself. Lawyers filed de-
tailed legal briefs, attacking or defending particular national policies;
faced with detailed questions, panels gave detailed answers; lawyers
then understood the reasoning supporting such answers as guidelines
for future litigation strategies. The EC and Japan initially resisted the
move to legalism; but they became active participants after being bom-
barded with complaints by the US and Canada. By the early 1980s, all of
the major trading states had armed their Geneva staffs with permanent
legal counsels.
Triadic governance
In activating TDR, GATT members delegated to the panel system an
authority that is inherently governmental. As panels exercised this au-
thority, they generated three sets of political outcomes; these outcomes
can only be explained by attending to the dynamics of TDR.
First, panels altered the terms of global exchange by provoking, with
their decisions, the modification of national trading rules. If complied
with, every decision declaring a national rule or practice inconsistent
with GATT rules concretely impacts the lives of importers, exporters,
consumers, and producers. Activating TDR worked in favour of plaintiff
30 In 1988, the US instituted proceedings against the EC’s payment regime for oilseed pro-
cessing. A panel ruled that the programme both discriminated against foreign processors
and functioned as an indirect subsidy for EC producers. France, invoking the consensus
norm, sought to suppress the decision but the EC adopted the ruling over France’s ob-
jection. The EC then replaced the payment system with a new one. In effect, the EC had
used TDR to delegitimise an outmoded, costly programme of which France had blocked
revision within internal EC law-making processes. Complaint #179, US v. EC (22 April
1988). Complaints have been assembled and numbered chronologically in Hudec, Enforc-
ing International Trade Law, Appendix. We use Hudec’s reference system to refer to cases
in this and subsequent notes.
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states: plaintiffs enjoyed a success rate of 77 per cent in the 1948–89
period, rising to 85 per cent in the 1980s. The rate of compliance with
adverse decisions was 74 per cent in the 1980–9 period.
To resolve many of the most complex disputes, panels had no choice
but to reach far into national jurisdictions. Thus, a panel ruled that a US
law providing a special administrative remedy for patent infringement
claims involving imported goods violated the GATT since defendants
stood a better chance of winning in district courts.31 To arrive at this de-
cision, panelists investigated US litigation rates and judicial outcomes,
concluding that biases in the administrative procedure constituted a
discriminatory bias affecting trade. In separate cases, panels required
Canada to force provincial governments to remove taxes on foreign
gold coins, and to force provincial liquor boards to change regulatory
practices favouring domestic alcoholic beverages.32
Panels reinforced their influence over policy outcomes by elaborat-
ing guidelines for state compliance. In explaining why a given national
practice was or was not inconsistent with GATT obligations, panels sug-
gested GATT-consistent versions of the practices in question. (Such be-
haviour inheres in triadic rule-making.) In 1986, to take just one instance,
the EC attacked the Japanese system of taxation for alcoholic bever-
ages.33 The system, which classified products into dozens of categories
corresponding to different tax rates, resulted in importers paying higher
taxes than Japanese producers for similar products. The panel declared
the system to be inconsistent with the treaty, and announced a general
rule: national tax schemes must treat all ‘directly competitive’ products
equally. It then elaborated a hypothetical system based on equal treat-
ment, demonstrating precisely what a lawful system would look like.
The Japanese subsequently adopted a system similar to the panel’s.
Second, in response to the exploitation of TDR by states for their own
political purposes, panels reinvented themselves as judges, the authori-
tative interpreters of the regime’s normative structure. This process can
be tracked and measured. As the number and complexity of complaints
grew, panels produced longer decisions and increasingly precise inter-
pretations of treaty provisions.34 In complicity with GATT litigators,
31 Complaint #162, EC v. US (29 April 1987).
32 Complaint #132, South Africa v. Canada (3 July 1984); complaint #139, EC v. Canada
(12 February 1985).
33 Complaint #154, EC v. Japan (6 November 1986).
34 In the 1948–69 period, the average length of reported rulings was seven pages; in the
1970–9 period, the average length rose to fifteen pages; after 1985, the average reached
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citations to past decisions became increasingly common and expected.
Once constructed as a precedent-based discourse about the meaning
of GATT rules, panel decisions became a fundamental source of those
rules. (Such rule-making took place despite the absence of a doctrine of
stare decisis in international law, and despite the refusal of the member
states to formally recognise the precedential value of decisions.) Certain
treaty provisions (for example, the MFN norm, rules governing taxation
and quotas) emerged as sophisticated, relatively autonomous domains
of legal discourse, replete with their own stable of argumentation frame-
works.35 By the 1980s at the latest, the rules in these domains could only
be understood in light of the argumentation frameworks curated by the
panels. Although the substance of this law is far beyond the scope of
this chapter, panels ratcheted up national responsibility to justify any
claimed exceptions to liberal trading rules which, among other things,
served to expand the grounds for future complaints.
Panels also generated rules governing their own jurisdiction.36 By the
end of the 1980s a stable case law asserted that, among other things,
panels could:
 not only review the consistency of national acts with the treaty, but
could also detail what kinds of similar, if hypothetical, acts might
violate GATT rules;
 announce answers to questions not raised by plaintiffs, but which
were nevertheless relevant to other trade disputes;
 report a ruling even if the dispute on which it was based had become
moot (for example, as a result of prior dyadic settlement), in order to
clarify GATT rules and thus facilitate future dyadic and triadic dispute
resolution.
forty-eight pages. Robert E. Hudec, ‘The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement’,
in M. H. Hart and D. B. Steger (eds.), In Whose Interest?: Due Process and Transparency in
International Trade (Ottawa: Center for Trade Policy and Law, 1992), p. 11.
35 Breaking down GATT complaints filed in the 1980s with reference to the article of the
Agreement in dispute provides some indication of the relative density of these areas. In
115 filings, disputants invoked specific parts of the Agreement 212 times. Four areas of
the law account for 71 per cent of total claims: the MFN norm (arts. 1 and 2, 21 per cent);
non-discrimination in taxation and regulation (art. 3, 10 per cent); elimination of quotas
(arts. 11, 13, 34 per cent); and nullification or impairment of benefits (art. 23, 6 per cent).
Of the 66 instances in which the special codes were invoked, the codes on subsidies were
involved 41 times (62 per cent). See Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The New GATT: Dispute Resolution
and the Judicialization of the Trade Regime’, in Mary L. Volcansek (ed.), Law Above Nations:
Supranational Courts and the Legalization of Politics (Gainsville: University Press of Florida,
1997).
36 Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, pp. 258–65.
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Third, judicialisation processes reconstructed how states understood
the nature of their own regime. States reacted to the development of a
rule-oriented mode of governance not by suppressing it, but by adjust-
ing to it. Their lawyers filed more and increasingly legalistic complaints,
and their diplomats ratified judicialisation in official agreements. Thus,
the 1979 ‘Understanding’ on dispute settlement placed the GATT’s sys-
tem on legal footing for the first time, codified dispute settlement pro-
cedures, and gave legal force to panel reports. In 1981, citing the over-
whelming complexity of litigation facing panelists, states permitted the
establishment of a Legal Office charged with rationalising procedures
and providing support for panel members. And in the Uruguay Round
(1986–92), states asked an autonomous group of experts to study how
TDR could be strengthened. The fruit of their efforts was the legal system
of the WTO.
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round transformed the GATT into the
WTO, providing for a system of compulsory adjudication of disputes.
The new rules: automatically confer jurisdiction to panels upon the re-
ception of a complaint; no longer permit unilateral vetoes of any stage
by either party; and provide for a broad range of measures to punish
non-compliance. An independent appellate body is charged with han-
dling appeals from panels. The body is composed of seven members
who possess ‘demonstrated expertise in law’.
Undeniably, the move from consensual to compulsory TDR could
not have taken place without a convergence in the preferences of the
most powerful trading states. The US had advocated more efficient dis-
pute settlement since the 1970s. The Americans had even taken mea-
sures in domestic law to unilaterally punish those who blocked or
refused to comply with GATT decisions; and the move provoked the
EU to adopt similar measures. Facing a trading world in which GATT
rules might be enforced unilaterally by the most powerful states, the
rest of the world joined the US and Europe in working to strengthen
multilateralism.
But, if converging state interests were crucial to the enhancement
of TDR in the GATT, judicialisation generated the context necessary
for that convergence. Judicialisation is socialisation. As states gained
experience with dispute settlement, as panels performed their dispute
resolution functions, as a stable case law enhanced legal certainty, GATT
members could afford to view triadic rule-making as a useful, cost-
effective guarantor of regime reciprocity. In the 1980s, states did not
consider abolishing the panel system, but debated how best to enhance
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it. By the end of the decade, a collective future without effective TDR
was no longer a serious option.
Dispute resolution and normative change
in the dyadic context
Though islands of triadic dispute resolution have emerged in interna-
tional relations, most international interactions are dyadic. Disagree-
ments between international actors are sometimes subject to resolution
by a third party, through arbitration, mediation, or referral to suprana-
tional courts or other formal mechanisms. But in many instances, when
actors contest the appropriateness of specific acts, or debate the meaning
of relevant norms, they do not or cannot refer the dispute to an outside
arbiter. Instead, each disputant seeks to persuade her rival, and third
parties, that her understandings of the rules and of the disputed acts are
correct. International actors deploy both arguments and material power
to bring others to their view. At one extreme, those with sufficient power
resources can impose their preferred solutions on other actors, though
they will simultaneously offer arguments designed to show that their
choices are also normatively justified. At the other extreme, when no
single actor can impose a solution, normative arguments about what
course of action is justified are crucial in establishing consensus.
The regular deployment of material resources, whether as incentive
or punishment, underlies the persistent image of international relations
as structured fundamentally by relations of power. The realist and ne-
orealist traditions deny that norms and suasion play any independent
role in international politics; actors offer arguments and invoke norms,
but only as decoration for what they would have done in any case.
Material structures are the only ones that count. Thus the powerful do
what they will and the weak accept what they must.
We argue that even actors with the greatest material resources do not
operate outside of normative structures. In the dyadic portions of inter-
national relations, where there is no authoritative dispute resolver, the
dynamic of normative evolution is not simply reducible to the exercise of
power. Three related arguments support this assertion. First, the range
of disputes that can be settled by the unilateral application of material
power or coercion is restricted and probably shrinking. Indeed, mili-
tary force (the ultimate currency in realist and neorealist approaches)
is simply not a factor in the vast majority of disputes. Indeed, the fre-
quency of wars among great powers has been in secular decline, and
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essentially non-existent since the Second World War. Thus the great
powers can impose armed faits accomplis in a small set of instances, and
these (in practice) only vis-à-vis weak or collapsed states. Second, in the
far more common situations where military force is not an option, the
great powers operate within a set of institutions (rules) most of which
they did not devise but rather inherited. They must therefore employ
persuasion, and for that they must assert their claims in terms of ex-
isting argumentation frames. Third, to the extent that powerful actors
internalise the rules, their values, goals, and choices are shaped from
within by normative structures that have been ‘domesticated’, a point
to which we return in the conclusion.
Normative change in the dyadic context
In both dyadic and triadic settings, the inevitable gap between rules
and actions generates disputes. As actors seek to resolve disputes, they
reason by analogy, invoke precedents, and give reasons, whether their
audience is a judge or a set of other governments. Two significant differ-
ences, however, distinguish dyadic international relations from triadic.
First, in the dyadic realm, the dispute resolution process is less for-
malised. As a consequence, it often resembles interstate bargaining, as
governments seek to persuade, and pressure, each other. Because the
process in general is less formal, the body of precedents available to
disputants is less formalised, which means that precedent establishes a
broader, less clearly delineated argumentation frame. Second, because
the discursive frame is more open and the process non-formalised, the
deployment of power resources is less mediated by institutions than it
is in a triadic setting.
Even so, the evolution of international norms in dyadic contexts fol-
lows a cyclical pattern similar to the one we saw in the triadic context.
The cycle begins with the constellation of existing norms, which pro-
vides the normative structure within which actors decide what to do
and evaluate the behaviour of others. Because rules cannot cover every
contingency, and because conflicts among rules are commonplace, ac-
tions regularly trigger disputes. The arguments are about which norm(s)
apply, and what the norms require or permit. Actors assert analogies be-
tween the act in question and some set of prior cases. When the analogy
is persuasive, other actors will agree that the current dispute should
fall under the same norms that covered the earlier (analogised) cases.
But the argument does not end there, for it remains to be determined
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what the norms require in the present instance. Again, players argue by
analogy with similar cases, in order to establish how the rules should
apply to the case in dispute (if there are mitigating factors, if the case
qualifies as an exception, and so on).
Even powerful states must make their case in terms of an existing
normative context. And even governments of the most dominant states
do not always prevail in these normative debates. As an illustration, the
case of the United States in its post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’ is quite
instructive. The United States has not always been able to win important
arguments, for example, with respect to Iraq. Even important friendly
states (France, Germany, Russia) refused to support Security Council
authorisation of the use of force against Iraq. The United States and its
allies proceeded with war anyway, and the arguments about the effect
of the war on international norms will continue for some time. Though
other states were unable to prevent the US-led invasion of Iraq, they will
be able to penalise the United States for what many governments view
as a violation of international rules.
The outcome of any discourse is to change the norms under dispute.
If everybody agrees that the norms apply without qualification, then
the norms have been strengthened and the scope of their application
clarified. If the relevant actors agree that the disputed act qualifies as
a justified exception to the norms, then the scope of their application
has also been clarified (the proliferation of exceptions, of course, can
weaken a rule, which is also a norm change). If the participants in the
discourse fail to reach consensus (as with Iraq), then that also modifies
the norms in question, leaving their status weakened or ambiguous. In
contrast with the triadic situation, where judges must make a decision,
in the dyadic context, nothing compels actors to reach a determination.
Thus disagreements over the meaning of the rules, and over the jus-
tifiability of specific acts, can continue unresolved over long periods
of time.
The crucial point, however, is that the cycle of normative change has
completed a turn. In a given normative structure, actions trigger dis-
putes. Argument ensues, grounded in analogies with previous cases.
The outcomes of these discourses (which also include the deployment
of power) modify the rules, whether by making them stronger or weaker,
clearer or more ambiguous. The cycle returns to its starting point, the
normative structure, but the normative structure has changed. The al-
tered norms establish the context for subsequent actions, disputes, and
discourses.
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The case of forcible humanitarian intervention
Since 1990, a series of humanitarian crises has thrown into relief a tension
between two sets of fundamental international norms. On the one hand,
sovereignty rules traditionally prohibited intervention in the internal
affairs of other states; on the other, the international community has
clearly made human rights a matter of collective concern and universal
norms. The question that pits these concerns against each other is: under
what conditions may armed intervention be justified to halt massive
human rights abuses occurring within the territory of a sovereign state?
The society of states has confronted that question directly in several
cases over the past decade; we assess a series of such cases beginning
with the question of safe havens in northern Iraq in 1991 and ending
with East Timor in 1999.
The resulting disputes over humanitarian intervention have gener-
ated precisely the kind of cycle we theorised above: rules provide the
social context for action, specific acts trigger disputes, disputes provoke
discourses, and discourses lead to modification of the rules. As a result
of this evolution, international society has developed rules that per-
mit, though they do not require, forcible intervention to halt grievous,
widespread human rights violations.37
The United Nations Security Council has provided the chief insti-
tutional forum for the disputes and discourses over the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention.
Precedent works in the dyadic world roughly as it does in the tri-
adic, through the creation of analogies. If humanitarian intervention
was permitted in A, and the case of B is similar in important respects,
then there is a plausible justification for intervening in B. Put differently,
once the Security Council has permitted intervention in one case, it be-
comes much more difficult to argue that the rules prohibit intervention
in a similar instance. Furthermore, when states do object to a proposed
intervention, they must offer counter-arguments permitted by the ar-
gumentation framework. Each subsequent similar decision strengthens
the discursive weight of the emerging norm. Thus participants in Secu-
rity Council deliberations devise their arguments in light of that body’s
prior decisions (as parties pleading before a court in the triadic setting
fashion their arguments with a view to prior judgements and opinions).
37 See Wayne Sandholtz, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Global Enforcement of Human
Rights?’, in Alison Brysk (ed.), Globalization and Human Rights (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2002).
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The proposition that participants in Security Council debates will de-
velop and use argumentation frameworks by deploying analogies and
precedents is not as obvious as it might appear. Indeed, Security Council
members face substantial incentives to deny that precedents play any
part in their decision-making, for at least two reasons. First, the mem-
bers of any given Security Council will prefer to maximise their own dis-
cretion. They will therefore tend to deny the notion that their decisions
should be constrained by what an earlier Council may have determined.
This is especially true since the composition of the fifteen-member Se-
curity Council regularly changes (aside from the five permanent mem-
bers). This is not the same as the normal turnover in personalities sitting
on a court or in a legislature, because it is not just the individuals but
the countries represented that rotate.
Second, with specific reference to humanitarian intervention, Secu-
rity Council members will consistently attempt to maximise the nor-
mative protections of state sovereignty, and to minimise any dilution
of them. The reason for this is straightforward: ambassadors in the
Security Council represent the governments of states, which have an
interest in preserving their own autonomy from outside intervention.
From the perspective of any given government, any precedent must
be seen as potentially dangerous, in that it could weaken their im-
munity against future interventions. For both reasons, we expect to
find generalised resistance to the idea of precedent in Security Council
decision-making.
Given the incentives to avoid both creating and referring to prece-
dent, any evidence of such activity will offer strong support for our
argument. Issues relating to sovereignty and the use of force within the
territory of another state constitute hard cases for our theory of nor-
mative evolution. The evidence shows, however, that Security Council
members, denying it all the while, create and consider precedent. The
representative of Zimbabwe captured this paradox in his remarks dur-
ing a discussion of the proposed intervention in Somalia: ‘Any unique
situation and the unique solution adopted create of necessity a prece-
dent against which future, similar situations will be measured.’38 We
take the use of precedent as evidence of an emerging argumentation
framework.
38 United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand
One Hundred and Forty-Fifth Meeting, 3 December 1992, S/PV.3145, p. 7.
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Rule contexts
Sovereignty norms are the fundamental constitutive rules of interna-
tional society. Two sovereignty-related rules erect a prima facie barrier to
forcible humanitarian intervention. The first, a constitutive precept of
international law, establishes exclusive internal jurisdiction. The second
is the ban on the use of violence: no state may resort to force of arms
in its interactions with other states. Non-intervention norms find ex-
pression in the UN Charter, especially in Article 2(7), which forbids the
UN organisation (or, in the prevailing interpretation, its member states)
‘to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state’. The ban against intervention has been reinforced
in ‘soft law’, through a series of General Assembly resolutions, includ-
ing the 1950 Peace Through Deeds Resolution, the 1957 Declaration
Concerning the Peaceful Coexistence of States, the Declaration on Inad-
missibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection
of their Independence and Sovereignty (1965), and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (1970).
United Nations rules against the use of force also create a presumption
against the legitimacy of armed humanitarian intervention. Article 2(4)
enunciates the famous injunction against the use or threat of force. The
Charter provides only two explicit exceptions to this prohibition. The
first is ‘individual or collective self-defence’ (Art. 51), and the second is
UN action, when mandated by the Security Council, to halt ‘threats to
the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’ (Chapter VII).
Thus the Charter does not identify enforcement of human rights as one
of the permissible justifications for the use of force. Legal scholars have
nevertheless argued that forcible humanitarian intervention is clearly
compatible with central objectives of the UN and that the absence of a
prohibition makes it permissible.39
International human rights norms have undergone steady develop-
ment since the Second World War; they also find expression in the United
Nations Charter and in other UN conventions and declarations. The
preamble to the Charter affirms a common ‘faith in fundamental hu-
man rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
39 Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edn
(Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997).
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rights of men and women’. Article 1 of the Charter enumerates the
purposes of the UN, which include the achievement of ‘international
cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion’ (Article 1(3)). Article 55(c) declares that the United
Nations ‘shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms’, and in the following article
‘all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement’ of those purposes
(Chapter IX, Article 56).
The members of the UN followed up with a series of declarations and
conventions that spelled out a range of human rights, starting with the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In Jack
Donnelly’s account,40 formal rule-making culminated with the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (both in 1966). Treaties on
special topics followed, including women’s rights (1979), torture (1984),
and the rights of children (1989). Still, by the mid-1990s, though ‘norms
and the process of norm creation have been almost completely collec-
tivized’, and monitoring has moved somewhat in that direction, ‘imple-
mentation and enforcement remain almost exclusively national’.41 In
short, though the UN Charter does not explicitly provide for collective
enforcement of human rights, there were clearly grounds to argue that
using force against massive abuses was consistent with the purposes of
the institution.
Disputes, discourse, precedent
International sovereignty rules are fundamentally in tension with uni-
versal human rights norms. Rule conflicts are brought to the surface by
actors who dispute the appropriate course of action in a specific circum-
stance. During the 1990s, a series of cases triggered Security Council
debates on humanitarian intervention. Instances of humanitarian inter-
vention did occur before 1990, but we focus on the post-1990 cases, for
two reasons. First, in the pre-1990 cases, when the Security Council
40 Jack Donnelly, ‘State Sovereignty and International Intervention: The Case of Human
Rights’, in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State
Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995),
p. 123.
41 Donnelly, ‘State Sovereignty and International Intervention’, p. 146.
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was involved, it was asked to condone or condemn interventions
that had already been carried out unilaterally (for instance, by India
in East Pakistan, France in Central Africa, Vietnam in Cambodia, and
Tanzania in Uganda).42 In contrast, in the 1990s, the Security Council
was asked to consider multilateral interventions under UN mandate
before the fact. Even in controversial instances of multilateral interven-
tion by groups of states without explicit Security Council authorisation
(northern Iraq, Kosovo), the UN had already debated and taken specific
actions in response to serious human rights concerns.
Second, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union
reconfigured the international political context. Prior to 1990, the super-
powers would veto any proposed intervention out of Cold War politico-
strategic concerns, thus excluding humanitarian intervention from mul-
tilateral decision-making in the UN. Since 1990, the Security Council has
been able to debate and often reach consensus in cases that previously
would have been deadlocked by the US–Soviet rivalry. In addition, the
nature of interventions changed. Before 1990, interventions were gener-
ally unilateral; after that date, most interventions have been multilateral.
The Security Council is the primary forum in which states debate
norms of humanitarian intervention. Though the speeches offered by
delegates are usually carefully scripted and involve generous doses of
posturing and pretence, the statements offered in Security Council meet-
ings do expose the normative arguments that actors deploy in order to
shape the rules. Participants understand that their statements become
part of a larger discourse and a permanent record, and frame norma-
tive claims in an effort to shape that discourse, as well as the inevitable
accumulation of precedent, in ways compatible with their perceived in-
terests and values. We have examined the transcripts of Security Coun-
cil debates on proposals for humanitarian intervention in nine cases:
Liberia, Iraq (the safe havens), Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor. These cases include all of the post-1990
interventions in which humanitarian objectives were central. In two of
them (Bosnia, Somalia), the Security Council authorised intervention by
42 These are the four cases commonly identified as instances of humanitarian interven-
tion pre-1990, though scholars disagree as to which ones should count. Tesón, Humani-
tarian Intervention, includes Uganda, Central Africa, East Pakistan, and the US invasion
of Grenada. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in Interna-
tional Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), includes East Pakistan, Cambodia,
and Uganda. Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving
World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), includes East Pakistan,
Central Africa, and Uganda.
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UN (‘blue helmet’) forces. In six cases (Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, East Timor), it authorised or expressed approval for
(after the fact) armed interventions carried out by coalitions of member
states (‘multilateral forces’). In two cases (Iraq, Kosovo) member state
coalitions conducted forcible humanitarian interventions without spe-
cific Security Council mandates but in the context of ongoing Security
Council efforts to deal with major human rights disasters.43
It bears keeping in mind that there are powerful reasons not to expect
the use of precedent in Security Council discussions. Indeed, we find
explicit and implicit attempts to avoid the setting of precedent. Explicit
efforts typically took the form of statements by national representa-
tives to the effect that in authorising intervention, the Security Council
was not establishing precedent for future cases. Implicit attempts to
suppress the formation of precedent involved statements that empha-
sised the ‘exceptional’, ‘singular’, or ‘unique’ situation confronting the
Security Council. By declaring that a given intervention is unique, states
assert that from the particulars of an exceptional case one cannot derive
general norms or principles. Such arguments are intended to foreclose
the drawing of analogies from one case where intervention was per-
mitted to a subsequent set of circumstances. No future case could ever
match the ‘singular’ features of, say, Somalia. But of course no two cases
ever match in all of their details; the question is whether actors construct
analogies between a few salient features of two cases that are, by defini-
tion, unique. The answer is that they do, because argument by analogy
and precedent is an inherent feature of normative reasoning.
We analysed the verbatim transcripts of twenty-two meetings of the
Security Council in which the topic of discussion was intervention to
halt or alleviate large-scale human rights abuses in nine countries. Meet-
ings of the Security Council are debates only in a loose sense. That is,
43 This brief summary necessarily omits many of the nuances relevant to individual cases.
For instance, we have included the case of Iraq even though the Security Council did not
expressly authorise forcible intervention to create the ‘no-fly zones’. In Resolution 688,
the Council addressed major human rights abuses occurring within Iraq and ordered that
country to allow unimpeded access by humanitarian relief organisations. In Liberia and
Sierra Leone, the Security Council declined to consider authorising intervention by UN
forces during the periods of most intense human rights violations, despite requests that it
do so. Instead, the Security Council endorsed the intervention carried out by a multina-
tional force sponsored by and composed of members of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS); the intervention force bore the acronym ECOMOG (ECOWAS
Monitoring Group). On Liberia, see David Wippman, ‘Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and
the Liberian Civil War’, in Lori F. Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention
in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
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members of the Council, and delegations that request to offer state-
ments to it, do not engage in direct exchanges of arguments and counter-
arguments in order to win votes. Some delegates speak before the vote,
and some speak after. The speeches are more like set pieces, as the mem-
bers essentially know in advance what the outcome of the vote will be.
Indeed, the serious debating and negotiating take place prior to the
meetings, in bilateral conversations or in ‘informal consultations’ of the
Security Council as a whole. Nevertheless, the official statements do re-
veal the normative stances adopted by the various states, as they seek
to imprint their interpretations of the norms on the public record.
We found direct or indirect attempts to negate the precedential value
of the decision being taken in six meetings, involving four cases (Iraq,
Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti). Indirect efforts include statements high-
lighting the uniqueness of the present case, so as to cut off analogies
and diminish its potential significance as precedent. An example comes
from the statement of the Spanish delegate during discussion of the
resolution to authorise a multinational intervention force for Haiti: ‘It
must be stressed that this decision is an exceptional one, taken in re-
sponse to the singular circumstances attending the Haitian crisis.’44
Direct efforts include explicit disavowals that the current decision would
create any precedent for future situations, like the following statement
by the Indian delegate in the meeting authorising forcible intervention
in Somalia: ‘The present action should not, however, set a precedent
for the future.’45 A statement by China regarding Somalia incorporates
both direct and indirect approaches: ‘It is our understanding that this
authorization is based on the needs of the unique situation in Somalia
and should not constitute a precedent for United Nations peace-keeping
operations.’46
More striking is the frequency with which speakers in the Security
Council made positive references to precedent. Table 1 reports all
thirty such references that we found in the twenty-two meetings.
Of these, twenty-two drew analogies with earlier cases. Nineteen of
these concerned previous Security Council decisions on humanitarian
intervention; the other three references were to Nazi Germany (2) or
South Africa. The remaining eight statements regarding precedent were
44 United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand
Four Hundred and Thirteenth Meeting, 31 July 1994, S/PV.3413, p. 19.
45 United Nations Security Council, S/PV.3145, p. 51.
46 United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand
One Hundred and Eighty-eighth Meeting, 26 March 1993, S/PV.3188, p. 22.
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Table 1 Uses of precedent in United Nations Security Council deliberations
Agenda Speaker’s
Date topic Precedent country UN Doc.
5 April 1991 Iraq South Africa United Kingdom S/PV.2982:64–65
13 Aug 1992 Bosnia Somalia Zimbabwe S/PV.3106:18
13 Aug 1992 Bosnia Nazi Germany Austria S/PV.3106:26
19 Nov 1992 Liberia Somalia Sierra Leone S/PV.3138:56
3 Dec 1992 Somalia Iraq, Bosnia Austria S/PV.3145:31
3 Dec 1992 Somalia Future – Bosnia Austria S/PV.3145:32
3 Dec 1992 Somalia Future Hungary S/PV.3145:48
3 Dec 1992 Somalia Future Zimbabwe S/PV.3145:7
31 Mar 1993 Bosnia Future France S/PV.3191:4
4 June 1993 Bosnia Kuwait Venezuela S/PV.3228:25
6 June 1993 Somalia Bosnia Pakistan S/PV.3229:7
6 June 1993 Somalia Future – Cambodia, Venezuela S/PV.3229:17
Yugoslavia
6 June 1993 Somalia Future – Bosnia, Russia S/PV.3229:22
Cambodia
8 June 1994 Rwanda Nazi Germany Czech Republic S/PV.3388:3
22 June 1994 Rwanda Somalia New Zealand S/PV.3392:7
15 July 1994 Haiti General past Sec. General S/1994/828:5–6
practice and
principles
31 July 1994 Haiti Future New Zealand S/PV.3413:22
26 Mar 1999 Kosovo Bosnia Bosnia S/PV.3989:14–15




10 June 1999 Kosovo Cambodia Netherlands S/PV.4011:13
10 June 1999 Kosovo Rwanda Canada S/PV.4011:13
10 June 1999 Kosovo Bosnia Malaysia S/PV.4011:16
10 June 1999 Kosovo Bosnia Bahrain S/PV.4011:19
10 June 1999 Kosovo Croatia Croatia S/PV.4011
(resumption):12
10 June 1999 Kosovo Slovenia, Croatia, Albania S/PV.4011
Bosnia (resumption):14
11 Sept 1999 E. Timor Somalia, Rwanda, Italy S/PV.4043
Bosnia, Kosovo (resumption):13
11 Sept 1999 E. Timor Kosovo Italy S/PV.4043
(resumption):14
11 Sept 1999 E. Timor Kosovo Austria S/PV.4043
(resumption):27
11 Sept 1999 E. Timor Future precedent Singapore S/PV.4043
(resumption):20
25 Oct 1999 E. Timor Rwanda, Somalia, Canada S/PV.4057:17
Haiti, Zaire
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prospective in nature, that is, they expressed a hope that the current
case would establish precedent for other specific crises or for the future
more generally. This is strong evidence that, even in settings where one
might not expect it, actors regularly refer to analogies and precedents
as they engage in collective normative reasoning.
In substantive terms, the resolutions approved in these meetings have
clearly pushed the development of norms permitting forcible inter-
vention to halt human rights violations.47 In Bosnia and Somalia, the
Security Council created precedents for deploying armed force to assist
in the delivery of emergency relief supplies. The Somalia case, in addi-
tion, broke new ground by authorising intervention in a crisis that did
not pose any real threat to international peace and security. With the in-
tervention in Haiti, the Security Council established that the UN could
act to restore to power a democratically elected government. Its deci-
sions on Haiti and East Timor, and its refusal to condemn the NATO
bombing campaign on behalf of Kosovo, showed that the UN could
authorise humanitarian intervention by multinational forces under
national command.48
Emergence of an argumentation framework
In short, a rudimentary argumentation framework has evolved in the
domain of forcible humanitarian intervention. It is now established that
forcible intervention is permissible, though not required, when abuses
of human rights are massive, that is, both grievous and numerous. No
standard of grievousness exists, but in all of the cases considered here,
the abuses included serious bodily violence (rape, torture, mutilation)
and deaths. Other kinds of human rights violations (detention without
filing charges, arbitrary arrest) do not justify forcible responses. Though
there is no precise threshold for ‘massive’, it is clear that occasional
47 We are not arguing that the interventions did in fact effectively curtail human rights
abuses. Indeed, the Security Council did not explicitly authorise intervention to assist the
Kurds or the Kosovar Albanians, though in both cases it did not condemn the actions of
multinational intervention forces. The Security Council essentially opted not to act on the
horrendous human rights violations occurring in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and offered
too little, too late to affect the genocide being carried out in Rwanda.
48 The Security Council discussed in March 1999 a draft resolution proposed by Russia,
Belarus, and India to condemn the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia as a
violation of international law and demand an immediate cessation. The resolution was
defeated by twelve votes to three, only China, Namibia, and Russia voting in favour.
Voting against the resolution were Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon,
Gambia, Malaysia, Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
A solid majority was therefore unwilling to condemn the intervention, though the point
was vigorously contested by other states.
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human rights violations, even continuing over a period of years, will not
invite armed intervention (other kinds of international response being
available). Conversely, opponents of intervention in a specific case can
argue that the abuses are not sufficiently widespread or serious to justify
military action against the offending state.
The argumentation framework also makes the case for intervention
stronger when a human rights crisis includes a transnational dimension,
by fomenting armed conflict in neighbouring states, or even by creat-
ing large flows of people fleeing from danger or forcibly expelled from
their homes. The counter-argument, of course, is that a particular crisis
is entirely internal to a country, in which case non-intervention norms
should apply (although the international community can provide assis-
tance to refugees without intervening militarily). Even so, it is clear that
many states regard governments engaged in massive human rights vi-
olations as having forfeited their sovereignty-based claims to immunity
from outside intervention.
A blanket non-intervention argument based simply on sovereignty is
clearly no longer valid. The cases decided in the 1990s will make it much
less plausible for governments to argue, in response to future large-scale
human rights violations in some part of the world, that international
norms prohibit intervention. Other potential exclusions have also been
weakened. ‘Legal’ intervention need not depend on a request or even
agreement from the target state. UN-led forces (blue helmets) are not the
only valid mode of intervention; the UN can also authorise groups of
willing states or regional organisations to carry out interventions under
national command.
Finally, the record of Security Council deliberations and decisions is
not the only indicator that an argumentation framework has emerged. It
is by now almost universally accepted among legal scholars that forcible
intervention to halt massive human rights abuses can be permissible
under international law. Indeed, among the publicists, the debate has
already moved on to fleshing out more of the details – conditions, ex-
ceptions, qualifications – of the argumentation framework.49
49 The legal literature is too voluminous to cite comprehensively; representative works
include Menno T. Kamminga, Inter-State Accountability for Violations of Human Rights
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); Laura W. Reed and Carl
Kaysen, Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, MA: American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, 1993); Lori F. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention
in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995); Murphy, Hu-
manitarian Intervention; Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian
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Conclusion
Two summary points deserve emphasis. First, we deny any inher-
ent, theoretically significant, distinction between how international and
domestic regimes operate. Put simply, the range of variation is as
great within categories of domestic and international as between these
categories, and mainstream international relations theory has woe-
fully failed to distinguish, theoretically, one kind of rule system from
another.50 Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia are hardly states at all,
in the Waltzian51 sense of being centralised; while in the international
system there exist zones constituted by highly institutionalised modes
of governance. Further, national politicians, interacting in domestic po-
litical contexts, can be more jealous of their prerogatives than statesmen
negotiating with one another on the global stage; and supranational
courts can be more effective on a day-to-day basis than many national
jurisdictions.
Second, we would like this chapter to be read as an attempt to for-
malise some important insights of process-based approaches to law,52
and to give better micro-foundations to rule-oriented constructivism.53
Neorationalist perspectives (game theory and rational choice) on in-
ternational regimes and legal systems have contributed to our under-
standing of why and how actors build new institutional arrangements
to help them achieve joint purposes. But neorationalism, to the extent
that it fails to provide a convincing account of why and how normative
discourse and legal institutions develop a ‘life of their own’, has not been
able to explain certain crucial dynamics of institutional change.54 Our
differences with neorationalists do not reduce to an argument about
the status of rationality. We assume that all actors are rational (in the
sense of seeking to maximise their subjective utility given both cogni-
tive and institutional limits), but take seriously the view that strategic
Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996);
Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention; and Wheeler, Saving Strangers.
50 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1989); and Stone, ‘What is a Supranational Constitution?’
51 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
52 For example, H. H. Koh, ‘The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home’,
Houston Law Review 35: 3 (1998).
53 For example, Nicholas Onuf, ‘The Constitution of International Society’, European Jour-
nal of International Law 5: 1 (1994).
54 See the exchange between Vanberg, ‘Reply to Stone Sweet’, and Stone Sweet, ‘Rules,
Dispute Resolution, and Strategic Behavior’.
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action is heavily conditioned by existing institutional arrangements and
normative uncertainty.
A more generic issue raised here is whether theoretical primacy
should be assigned, a priori, to normative-ideational rather than
material-physical power. At times, these two types of influence (or types
of resources for action), may be in opposition to one another, as when one
excludes the use of the other. More often, they are interlinked, with their
relative importance varying according to the social context. In triadic
settings, formal dispute resolution procedures and bodies of precedent
substantially mediate the effects of material power resources. Indeed,
some systems of triadic dispute resolution may explicitly seek to dilute,
if not eliminate, the effects of material disparities, by forcing parties
to engage in normative suasion within structures of precedent and ar-
gumentation. In dyadic contexts, material power is presumptively less
mediated, but may nonetheless be shaped and constrained by normative
structures.
If powerful states dictate international rules and change them as they
please, then we need only focus on material power relations and the
analysis need go no further. To be sure, powerful countries often exercise
the greatest influence on the rules of international society. Indeed, we
take it as axiomatic that in any social system, institutions, ‘or at least
the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the
bargaining power to devise new rules’.55 Powerful actors (rich countries,
large transnational companies) can offer payoffs to those who agree to
their preferred rules, and they can inflict costs on those who refuse.
More subtly, but perhaps more pervasively, powerful actors shape the
broader intellectual and cultural environment within which other actors
make their way. It is not necessarily the case that leading states actively
manipulate ideas and culture for their own benefit; the point is closer to
the Gramscian one that simply by virtue of their size and reach, leading
states produce much of the scientific, legal, and cultural environment
within which other actors live.
Still, the emergence and evolution of international norms can have
an impact even on powerful states through various mechanisms. We
have focused on mechanisms associated with norm-based conflict and
organised dispute resolution in this chapter, but of course there are oth-
ers. The development of international rule structures (like rights), for
example, can offer transnational actors, and a state’s own subjects, new
55 North, Institutions, p. 16.
270
Law, politics, and international governance
possibilities for pursuing their political interests. Much of the action in
modern international law concerns how international norms are noticed,
absorbed, and used politically within the legal frameworks of states.
Citizens, groups, firms, non-governmental organisations, and govern-
mental officials may then be led to alter their own cognitive schema,
values, and decision-making in light of such processes. This dynamic
deserves more attention in light of the themes raised by this volume,56
and in light of the constructivist claim that international norms are ba-
sic to how states’ values, objectives, and identity are constructed and
evolve over time.57
56 But see Koh, ‘The 1998 Frankel Lecture’; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr,
‘How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules
and Norms’, International Studies Quarterly 40: 4 (1996); and Andrew P. Cortell and James
W. Davis, Jr, ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research
Agenda’, International Studies Review 2: 1 (2000).
57 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International
Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); and Alexander Wendt,
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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